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Of Guilds and Men:
Copyright Workarounds in the
Cinematographic Industry
by
*
ADRIANE PORCIN
The motion picture industry utilizes a varied collection of more or
less formal mechanisms for dealing with the collective nature of
audiovisual works, ranging from collective bargaining to legal
presumptions. What these instances of copyright workarounds have
in common is that they are all about circumventing traditional notions
of authorship (the right to be deemed the author of a work) and
ownership (the right to exert control over a work). When considered
from an international perspective, the cinematographic industry is
fertile ground for an exploration of such mechanisms.
After a recitation of the Berne Convention, this paper will
proceed to discuss countries where the Berne Convention has been
applied to audiovisual works with drastically different results: France
and the United States. From there it will retrace the history of the socalled Foreign Levies Agreement. This agreement illustrates the
collision of the French and American copyright workarounds. It was
born from, inter alia, a dispute between the Directors’ Guild of
America (DGA), the Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) and several
movie producers upon the collection and distribution of foreign levies
to American authors. This study will then discuss the contractual
*
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“So when people ask why we writers call ourselves ‘labor,’ the
easiest answer is that we don’t—the companies do. They demand
that we be employees so that they can reap the full benefits of
1
copyright exploitation, and that’s fine. Honestly.”
Our tale will start at the end of the story.
More precisely, our tale will start with the credits. TV series,
documentaries, motion pictures, and animations all share one
characteristic: after a long litany of names, they close with a statement
regarding copyright. Such statements can take many forms and

1. Craig Mazin, Who strikes? ‘Labor’ Because Studios Say So, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-op-dustup10dec10,0,4285139.story.
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shapes, but boil down to one main principle: whoever invested in the
movie intends to obtain protection of their investment.
Julie Cohen contends that copyright “creates a foundation for
predictability in the organization of cultural production, something
particularly important in capital-intensive industries like film
2
production.” The story we will unfold will prove her both right and
wrong. It is true that predictability is a sought-after side effect of
copyright. However, it is also true that the structure of the
international copyright system can defeat the best prepared. The
parties concerned will, in turn, seek solutions around and outside
copyright to devise sound and foreseeable legal constructs.
The motion picture industry, when considered from an
international perspective, is fertile ground for an exploration of such
copyright workarounds.
From collective bargaining to legal
presumptions, it presents a varied collection of more or less formal
mechanisms dealing with the collective nature of audiovisual works.
What these instances of copyright workaround have in common is
that they are all about circumventing traditional notions of authorship
(the right to be deemed the author of a work) and ownership (the
right to exert control over a work).

I. A (Not so Brief) Introduction
This introduction will open with a reminder of the Berne
Convention and proceed to countries where the Berne Convention
has been applied to audiovisual works with drastically different
results: France and the United States. Part II will then retrace the
history of the so-called Foreign Levies Agreement born from, inter
alia, the discrepancies between the French and American copyright
laws. From there, Part III will delineate underlying issues of
collective action in this context.
A. The Berne Convention

Article 5 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
3
and Artistic Works ensures that a foreign author based in a signatory

2. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (2011).
3. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art 5, Sept. 9,
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on September 28, 1979)
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Article 5 provides that:
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country can claim the same copyright protection as local authors,
whether or not he enjoys protection in his own country. For example,
since both the United States and France signed the Berne
4
Convention, an American right-holder whose works are exploited in
France can claim the same rights as French right-holders in France.
In addition to granting protection to foreign authors, the Berne
5
Convention provides for minimum protection standards.
Consequently, signatory countries are free to increase copyright
protection through any mechanism of their liking. Therefore, the
protection regimes for a given right can drastically vary from one
State to another. This is precisely the case for ownership in motion
pictures. Article 14 bis (2)(a) of the Berne Convention states that
“ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter

“(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country
of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this
Convention.
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of
protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country
where protection is claimed.
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However,
when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for
which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that
country the same rights as national authors (...).”
4. France signed the Berne Convention on September 9, 1886 and ratified it on
September 5, 1887. The treaty entered into force on December 5, 1887. The United States
joined the Berne Convention on November 16, 1988. The treaty came into force on March
1, 1989. For an up-to-date list of signatory countries of the Berne Convention, see
Contracting
Parties,
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept.
27, 2012).
5. Berne Convention, supra note 3, at 19: “The provisions of this Convention shall
not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may be
granted by legislation in a country of the Union.” See also id. at 20: “The Governments of
the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among
themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those
granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention.
The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain
applicable.”
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for legislation in the country where protection is claimed.” 6
Furthermore, the Berne Convention does not contain provisions
regarding employers and employees. In short, signatory countries are
free to craft specific authorship rules for motion pictures, and to
7
assign ownership to whomever they see fit.
B. Implementation of the Berne Convention

Gérard Lyon-Caen notes there are two dominant conceptions of
authorship in cinematographic works, which in turn impact the
8
determination of ownership. On one side, some countries prefer a
9
On the other side, other countries
creator-based approach.
emphasize the economic aspects of cinematographic production and
10
vest copyright in the producer. This paper will limit its illustration to
one example of each school of thought, starting with French copyright
law as an example of the physical-person centered droit d’auteur
11
system , and continuing with the American example of a produceroriented copyright system.

6. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 128 (2d ed. 2006),
stating that “[t]he inclusion of cinematographic works under the umbrella of the Berne
Convention had long been the cause of considerable difficulty, both from a doctrinal and a
practical point of view… Accordingly, there were many national differences in the
treatment of cinematographical works, particularly in relation to the questions of
authorship and ownership...The result was the adoption of a new conventional regime
governing cinematographic works. This was embodied in article 14, which dealt with the
rights of authors with respect to cinematographic reproduction and adaptations of their
works, and a new article 14 bis, which dealt with rights in the cinematographic works
themselves and the exploitation of these rights.” About the 1967 Stockholm Revision
Conference, see generally id. at 120.
7. Id. at 7.32.
8. Gérard Lyon-Caen, Le cinéma dans la Convention de Berne (Bureau
international pour la protection des oeuvres littéraires et artistiques, 1960) at 9. See also
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 6, at 365.
9. Lyon-Caen, supra note 8, at 11.
10. Id. at 10 (noting that this approach is not limited to copyright countries).
11. For a thorough study of the French framework for audiovisual works, see
CHRISTINE HUGON, LE RÉGIME DE L’OEUVRE AUDIOVISUELLE (Litec, 1993).
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Article 14 of the French Loi n°57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la
12
propriété littéraire et artistique (hereafter Loi du 11 mars 1957)
introduced a presumption of authorship benefiting a list of physical
13
persons involved in the making of the audiovisual work, now
14
codified in article L. 113-7 C.P.I.. It specifies that the physical
person who directed the work is regarded as its author, and that the
author of the script, the author of the adaptation, the author of the
dialogue, the author of the soundtrack composed for the work, and
the director are to be considered as authors in the absence of proof to
15
the contrary.
This position is consistent with article 14 bis (2) of the Berne
16
Convention as well as with the European legal environment.

12. Loi n°57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et artistique, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, [J.O.], 14 March 1957, p. 2723 [hereinafter
Loi du 11 mars 1957].
13. For a detailed analysis of the presumption mechanism, see HENRI DESBOIS, LE
DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 147-61 (Dalloz, 3d ed. 1978).
14. Loi n° 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992 relative au code de la propriété intellectuelle,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, [J.O.] 3 July 1992, p. 8801
[hereinafter Loi du 1er juillet 1992].
15. L. 113-7 C.P.I. :“Ont la qualité d’auteur d’une oeuvre audiovisuelle la ou les
personnes physiques qui réalisent la création intellectuelle de cette oeuvre.
Sont présumés, sauf preuve contraire, coauteurs d’une oeuvre audiovisuelle réalisée
en collaboration : 1° L’auteur du scénario ; 2° L’auteur de l’adaptation ; 3° L’auteur du
texte parlé ; 4° L’auteur des compositions musicales avec ou sans paroles spécialement
réalisées pour l’oeuvre ; 5° Le réalisateur.
Lorsque l’oeuvre audiovisuelle est tirée d’une oeuvre ou d’un scénario préexistants
encore protégés, les auteurs de l’oeuvre originaire sont assimilés aux auteurs de l’oeuvre
nouvelle” (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the choice of authors, see HUGON, supra note 12, at 97-103. For an
empirical study of authors’ remuneration for TV broadcasting in France, see Françoise
Benhamou and Stéphanie Peltier, Le droit d’auteur, incitation à la création ou frein à la
diffusion ? Une analyse empirique du cas de la création télévisuelle 135:3 REVUE
D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 47, 51, 58 (2011).
16. The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, was approved by
the European Community, see Council Decision of 16 March 2000 on the Approval, on
Behalf of the European Community, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 2000/278/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 89) 6. Article 1(4) of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty provides that contracting parties are to comply with articles 1 to
21 of the Berne Convention.
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Indeed, in its recent Luksan decision, 17 the European Court of Justice
restated the European Community position on this question. In 1992,
article 2(2) of Directive 92/100/EEC on Rental Right and Lending
Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of
Intellectual Property provided that, “for the purposes of this
Directive, the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual
work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors. Member
18
States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors.”
This principle has been reaffirmed in subsequent pieces of
19
legislation.
b.

Attribution of Ownership

In addition to article 14 provisions regarding authorship, article 17
of the Loi du 11 mars 1957, 20 now article L. 132-24 C.P.I., 21 framed the
exploitation of cinematographic works. According to this article, any
agreement between the authors and the producer automatically
transfers to the producer all exclusive exploitation rights, meaning full
22
control save a few exceptions. For example, the director’s rights are

17. Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let, Case C-277/10, Feb. 9, 2012,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119322&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=415563 (last visited Oct 15, 2012).
18. Now replaced by article 2(2) of EC, Directive 2006/115/EC of 12 December 2006
on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field
of Intellectual Property, 2006 O.J. L 376/28.
19. Directive 93/83 of the Council of the European Communities of 27 September 1993
on the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to
Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L248)
1(5). See also Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 2006 O.J. (L372) 2(1).
20. Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note 12. For a detailed analysis of article 17, see
DESBOIS, supra note 13 at 672-78. Article 17 was consolidated in article 63-1 by the Loi
n°85-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistes-interprètes,
des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes et des entreprises de communication
audiovisuelle, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 4 July 1985, p.
7495 [hereinafter Loi du 3 juillet 1985], see ANDRÉ LUCAS ET HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS,
TRAITÉ DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 726-31(LexisNexis, 3d. ed. 2006).
21. Loi du 1er juillet 1992, supra note 14.
22. L. 132-24 C.P.I.: “Le contrat qui lie le producteur aux auteurs d’une oeuvre
audiovisuelle, autres que l’auteur de la composition musicale avec ou sans paroles,
emporte, sauf clause contraire et sans préjudice des droits reconnus à l’auteur par les
dispositions des articles L. 111-3, L. 121-4, L. 121-5, L. 122-1 à L. 122-7, L. 123-7, L. 131-2 à
L. 131-7, L. 132-4 et L. 132-7, cession au profit du producteur des droits exclusifs
d’exploitation de l’oeuvre audiovisuelle.
Le contrat de production audiovisuelle n’emporte pas cession au producteur des
droits graphiques et théâtraux sur l’oeuvre.
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automatically transferred to the producer by contract, provided the
agreement contains no clause to the contrary. In any case, the
contract must determine compensation for the authors, based on each
23
and every use of the work, and has to specify, precisely and in
writing, which elements are granted and which elements are
24
withheld.
Henri Desbois reports that the initial wording of the provision
presented by the French Parliament was very broad. Over the course
of parliamentary debates, it was reduced to the rights necessary for
25
the cinematographic exploitation of the audiovisual work.
According to Desbois, the default rule in the original 1957 law only
26
allowed for a very restrictive use. Nevertheless, the Loi n° 85-660 du
3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistesinterprètes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes et
27
des entreprises de communication audiovisuelle (hereafter Loi du 3
juillet
1985)
replaced
the
droit
exclusif
d’exploitation
cinématographique, arguably limited to exploitation in movie
theatres, by the droits exclusifs d’exploitation de l’oeuvre
audiovisuelle, including all possible ways to make the movie
28
available—television, cable, sale of videotapes .
Thus, the producer, albeit not deemed the author of the work
under French law, is able to exert full control of all the rights
necessary for a normal exploitation of the audiovisual work. The

Ce contrat prévoit la liste des éléments ayant servi à la réalisation de l’oeuvre qui sont
conservés ainsi que les modalités de cette conservation.”
Article L. 132-24 CPI wording is, at best, confusing, see LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note
20 at 726, speaking of malfaçon législative (defective legislative work). For an illustration,
see Cass. soc., 3 mars 2004, D. 2004.2494 (Annot. Jean-Luc Piotraut and Pierre-Jean
Dechristé), R.T.D. Com. 2004 p. 726 (Annot. Frédéric Pollaud-Dulian).
23. L 132-25 C.P.I., formerly articles 26 and 35 of the Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note
12, consolidated in article 63-2 by the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20. See HUGON,
supra note 11 at 436-63. On the redundant nature of the provision, see PIERRE-YVES
GAUTIER, PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 601, 607 (Presses Universitaires de
France, 7th ed. 2010).
24. HUGON, supra note 11, at 426-35. Such a mechanism is consistent with article
14bis (2) and (3) of the Berne Convention, supra note 3. See GAUTIER, supra note 23 at
600, 610. See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 6 at 386.
25. DESBOIS, supra note 13, at 674.
26. Id., adding in note 1: “seuls, les droits dont l’exercice est nécessaire à
l’exploitation normale, sont présumés avoir été cédés (...).”
27. Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
28. See LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 20, at 728; HUGON, supra note 11, at 428.
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problem is some of the relevant rights are subject to specific rules
29
restricting the authors’ ability to dispose of their rights.
c.

Mandatory Collective Management

The compensation regimen for private copying of analog media is
an example of these specific rules. With the arrival of VCR,
consumers were able to create copies at home, infringing authors’
exclusive right of reproduction. The economic damages resulting
from private copying were taken into account by article 31 of the Loi
30
du 3 juillet 1985, later codified in article L. 311-1 C.P.I.. Basically,
the law balanced authors’ inability to properly exert their exclusive
31
right by granting them a non-exclusive right to remuneration. This
compensation took the form of a fixed-rate levy on the sales of video
32
tapes and other media. To manage the levy, the law imposed a
mandatory system of collective management for private copying of
videos on blank media.
In practice, the private copying levies’ basis and rate are
determined by the Commission sur la rémunération pour copie privée,
33
an administrative tariff-setting body, and paid by blank media
34
producers and importers. A copyright collective, the Société des
35
auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (hereafter SACD), acts as an
29. On the opacity of the remuneration system in the French motion picture industry,
see Joëlle Farchy, Caroline Rainette & Sébastien Poulain, Économies des droits d’auteur.
II - Le cinéma, 2007:5 CULTURE ÉTUDES 1, 16 (2007). For an equivalent study for TV
industry see Françoise Benhamou and Stéphanie Peltier, Économies des droits d’auteur. III
- La télévision 2007:6 CULTURE ÉTUDES 1, 6-7(2007).
30. L. 311-1 C.P.I., formerly article 31 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
Despite its unclear wording, article L. 311-2 C.P.I. is to be understood as covering foreign
right-holders as they are deemed to be French authors, see GAUTIER, supra note 23, at 280
and 288; LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 20, at 1147.
31. Literally, a right to exclude, a jus prohibendi. The code recognizes the
impossibility of determining a proper basis for proportional compensation, see article
L 131-4 C.P.I., formerly article 35 of the Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note 13, and article 49
of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
32. L. 311-3 C.P.I., formerly article 32 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
33. Id. at L. 311-5 C.P.I., formerly article 34.
34. Id. at L. 311-4 C.P.I., formerly article 33, aiming at “supports d’enregistrement
utilisables pour la reproduction à usage privé d’oeuvres fixées sur des phonogrammes ou
des vidéogrammes.”
35. SACD, http://www.sacd.fr/A-society-for-and-by-authors.750.0.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). SACD statutes provides that: “[t]he object of the Society is: 1) The
protection of the rights of its members with respect to all users and, in general, the
protection of the moral and material interests of the members of the Society and that of
the author’s profession; ... 3) Exercise and management in all countries of all the rights
involved in performance or reproduction, in any form whatsoever, of the works of its
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intermediary between Copie-France, 36 the organization in charge of
collecting all private copying levies related to audiovisual works, and
37
the directors, screen writers, and writers. Interestingly, it is not a
voluntary collective management system. Authors do not have to be
members of the SACD to benefit from its collecting, clearing, and
distributing services.
The provision imposing collective management for private
copying presents a few noteworthy characteristics. First, article
L. 311-1 C.P.I. specifically mentions authors, whereas other
mandatory collective management schemes, such as cable
38
retransmission, aim at right-holders at large. Second, this article
creates a non-exclusive right to compensation, as discussed above,
which by nature differs from the exclusive right covered by article
39
L. 132-24 C.P.I. Thus, it is not covered by the presumption of
40
transfer. Third, article L. 311-7 C.P.I. specifies that, for audiovisual
works, the distribution key for the levies is of one third for authors,
one third for producers and one third for interpreters, thereby
41
limiting producers’ share to one third. For all these reasons, the
presumption of transfer created by article L. 132-24 C.P.I. does not
cover the remuneration for private copying. Consequently, American

members, notably the collection and distribution of the royalties derived from the exercise
of the above rights, including within the framework of article L. 122-9 of the Code of
Intellectual Property; 4) Pooling of part of the collected royalties...,” Statutes and General
Regulations, SACD, 5, http://www.sacd.fr/uploads/tx_sacdresources/statuts_eng_02.pdf.
See also, generally, Sophie Poinsot under supervision of Hubert Tilliet, Fasc. 1570 Sociétés
de perception et de répartition des droits - Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques
(SACD) JURIS-CLASSEUR PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE (2010).
36. COPIE FRANCE, http://www.copiefrance.fr/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). CopieFrance is an umbrella collective gathering several copyright collectives, see COPIEFRANCE, Organization Chart, http://www.copiefrance.fr/l_quisommesnous_2b.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
37. L. 311-6 C.P.I., formerly article 35 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
38. L. 132-20-1 C.P.I., introduced by the Loi n°97-283 du 27 mars 1997 portant
transposition dans le code de la propriété intellectuelle des directives du Conseil des
Communautés européennes nos 93/83 du 27 septembre 1993 et 93/98 du 29 octobre 1993,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 28 March 1997, p.4831.
39. It is considered as an “amputation” of the exclusive right, see GAUTIER, supra
note 23, at 279.
40. L. 311-7 C.P.I., formerly article 36 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
41. Gautier considers that article 14 bis 2 b) of the Berne Convention would allow an
American producer to benefit from the third allotted to producers, but not the third
allotted to authors. see GAUTIER, supra note 23, at 280.
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producers cannot claim the levies collected in France for American
42
motion pictures’ authors.
Altogether, these elements demonstrate the French legislator’s
intent to ensure the creator a fair share of the economic value of his
work by placing the creative individual at the heart of the
43
compensation regime.
d.

Summary

In summary, the default system works as follows:
France
Author
Owner
Exclusive exploitation
The physical person
rights for the audiovisual who authored the
work
work
(presumed authors:
the author of the
Other exclusive rights
script, the author of
(adaptation,
the adaptation, the
translation. . .)
author of the
dialogues, the author
of the soundtrack
composed for the
Right to remuneration
work and the director)
(private copying)

2.

The producer
(unless provided
otherwise
in
writing)
The
physical
person
who
authored the work
(unless provided
otherwise
in
writing)
The
physical
person
who
authored the work

The American System: Collective Bargaining as a Workaround

Contrary to the French system, the American copyright system is
producer-centered. The idea of employer’s copyright ownership was
44
first introduced in common law circa 1900, and became a statutory
45
provision with the 1909 Copyright Act.
42. Neither can they use the work for hire doctrine (infra note 47) since the Berne
Convention imposes French law when the protection is claimed in France.
43. HUGON, supra note 11, at 202.
44. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine 15
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 59 (2003).
45. Id. at 62. She goes on: “The decision to label the employer an ‘author,’ rather
than create a default rule of implied automatic assignment, appears to have been based on
three considerations. First, it was a matter of ease in statutory drafting (‘author’ is a term
of art used throughout the statute). Second, it avoided constitutional doubts about a
default rule of employer ownership stemming from the constitutional provision that
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Authorship, Ownership and Works Made for Hire

Section 101 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976 states that
a work made for hire is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as
a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work . . . if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
46
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. . .
As pinpointed by Catherine Fisk, “[a]ttribution of authorship is a
matter of proof, not a process of cultural attribution, and when
corporations are deemed authors, it is because they have hired people
47
who created works.” Furthermore, § 201(b) adds that:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer, or other
person for whom the work was prepared, is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
48
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
In the U.S. film industry, most of all copyrightable contributions
to a movie fall in the work made for hire category, “with the hiring
party, usually the producer/financier, deemed both the author and the
49
initial owner of the copyright in the contributions.” Consequently,
“[t]he owner of any copyrighted work that is created as a work for
hire has all the rights of copyright owners, including the right to
decide whether to produce [the work] into a film for theatrical
50
release, directly for DVD, for television, or not to produce it at all.”

Congress may give ‘authors’ a copyright. Third, and most importantly, the drafters of the
revision wanted to be sure that the employer would be the initial copyright owner rather
than an assignee, because only the initial owner is entitled to obtain a renewal.” Id.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
47. Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 44, at 4.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2006).
49. F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion
Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 228 (2002). For a discussion of
authorship in several kinds of contributions to motion pictures, see id. at 282-316.
50. Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for
Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215, 217 (2011).
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Collective Bargaining in the Motion Picture Industry

But there is a second contractual layer of copyright attribution
superimposed on the statutory rules regarding works made for hire.
51
Indeed, to counteract the very integrated Hollywood studio system,
52
artists unionized in the 1930s to negotiate a legal framework
regulating economic relationships between movie producers and
creators, in order “to protect the status and creative control of
53
writers.”
Why were independent contractors and professionals such as
screen-writers were allowed to unionize in the first place? In 1938, the
American National Labor Relations Board recognized “the power of
producers to dictate the content of writers’ work, to assign parts of
54
stories, to stipulate where writers were to write.” This recognition
allowed screen-writers to bargain collectively on labor issues. From
55
this point, the Writers Guild of America (hereafter WGA)
concluded agreements with the Alliance of Motion Picture and
56
regarding work conditions and, most
Television Producers

51. Kevin Lee, ‘The Little State Department’: Hollywood and the MPAA’s Influence
on U.S. Trade Relations, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 373 (2008). “Under the studio
system, a film studio controlled all stages of a movie’s economic life, from the birth of the
screenplay written by a studio-employed writer to film production to final distribution in a
studio-owned theater. …At the height of the studio system era, Hollywood produced an
average of 400 films each year between 1930 and 1950, with a peak of 504 films
approximately one film per week for each studio-in 1941.” Id.
52. For a history of the development of the guilds, see HUGH LOVELL AND TASILE
CARTER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: A STRUGGLE
FOR STABILITY 34-38 (Institute of Industrial Relations at UC Berkeley ed., 1955).
53. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50 at 266.
54. Id. at 228, referring to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and al., 7 NLRB 662
(1938). See Chester C. Ward, Discrimination under the National Labor Relations Act, 48
YALE L. J. 1152, 1185 n.265 (1939) (the Board “rejected the argument that the Act was
intended to protect only wage earner in the lower income brackets and hence does not
apply to creative and professional workers payed [sic] as much as 2,000$ a week”).
55. Actually, the first collective agreement was signed in 1940 by the Screen Writers
Guild. Several unions, including the Screen Writers Guild, merged into WGA East and
West in 1954. see WGA, Timeline, http://www.wgaw.org/history/timeline.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). For technical reasons of no relevance for this article, WGA is actually
composed of two unions, Writers Guild of America West, http://www.wga.org (last visited
Sept. 28. 2012) and Writers Guild of America East, https://www.wgaeast.org (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). On the development of a national bargaining unit for writers, see LOVELL
& CARTER, supra note 52 at 51.
56. “The AMPTP, the entertainment industry’s official collective bargaining
representative, negotiates 80 industry-wide collective bargaining agreements on behalf of
over 350 motion picture and television producers (member companies include the
production entities of the studios, broadcast networks, certain cable networks and

14

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

importantly, regulating screen credits. Today, the WGA represents
TV and film writers and “determine[s] who is credited for writing.
57
Credit determinations, in turn, affect what writers get paid…”
As further explained by Catherine Fisk:
Screen credit supports a system of revenue-sharing (residuals)
and of unbundling the rights encompassed in a copyright
(separated rights) that compensates writers during periods of
slack employment, thus keeping their human capital in the
industry. The Guild has thus used the power it has under
labor law as the exclusive representative of writers in
collective negotiations with production companies to modify
the effects of the work for hire doctrine in copyright law and
58
to create a system of moral rights.
Indeed, the WGA developed a system of authorship attribution
59
by credit that has no equivalent in other intellectual property fields.
“Apart from the very great reputational significance of being seen as
a credited writer, and its impact on the job prospects of the writer,
screen credit determines the writer’s share of the copyright’s value in
60
the form of separated rights and residual payments.”

independent producers).” ASSOCIATION OF MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION
PRODUCERS, http://www.amptp.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
57. Fisk, Screen credit, supra note 50 at 216. For the origin of the right to manage
credits, see WGA, 2008 Writers Guild of America-Alliance of Motion Picture & Television
Producers
Theatrical
and
Television
Basic
Agreement,
29,
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=1610 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (Credits for
Screen Authorship (General)) and Schedules A and B. The website mentions that: “[t]he
2011 MBA is now in effect. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) may be downloaded
below, along with the 2008 MBA which the MOA amends. The full text of the 2011 MBA
will be published and posted in the near future.” Id.
58. Fisk, supra note 50, at 219. For a comparison between moral rights and screen
credits, see Bayard F. Berman & Sol Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law, 9 UCLA L.
REV. 156, 158 (1962).
59. Fisk, supra note 50, at 247-48: “[t]he elaborate legal process surrounding credit
determinations distinguish the WGA and Hollywood from any other area of cultural
production, and are unique in the law. They bring the ideas of the rule of law--uniform
rules, fairly applied, based on evidence and reasoned argument--to the question of what it
means to be the author of a story. Unlike other places in both law and culture where
authorship is taken as a (relatively) easily discernible fact, credit arbitrations treat
authorship as contestable and as something that can be determined only through a process
designed and administered by and for Guild writers. Everyone in Hollywood knows that
credited authorship is, in some sense, a fiction when multiple writers have worked on a
film, but it is important to writers that it be a legal fiction.”
60. Fisk, id. at 258.
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The Writers Guild of America-Alliance of Motion Picture &
61
Television Producers Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement,
usually referred to as the Minimum Basic Agreement (hereafter
MBA), covers separated rights and residual payments, which are
based on screen credits. Article 13 of the MBA sets the minimal
compensation (“flat deal”) to be received by a writer for his
employment, depending on the extent of his contribution and the
nature of the audiovisual work.
Article 16 deals with separation of rights. If a writer is qualified
62
for separation of rights (meaning that he wrote an original story)
and receives a “Story by,” “Written by,” or “Screen Story by” credit,
he is entitled to separated rights. As such, article 16 actually bypasses
the work made for hire doctrine. Even though the producer is
deemed the sole author and owner of the rights, under certain
conditions detailed in the MBA, the writers can benefit from rights
such as the right to publish a movie script in whole or in substantial
63
part.
The protection of residuals is another way to circumvent the work
for hire doctrine. Residuals are “additional payments to workers for
the exhibition of an entertainment product in media other than the
one for which it was originally created, or for its reuse within the
same medium subsequent to the initial exhibition. They are
64
sometimes called ‘re-use fees’ or “supplemental contributions.” As
stated by Robert Gilbert, residuals represent extra compensation, in
65
addition to basic wages, salaries, or fees.
61. MBA, supra note 57.
62. Id. at 16.A.2, 16.B.1.
63. Id. at 16.A.3.a. Other examples include the right to a production intended to
exploit the dramatic rights in the story, screenplay or motion picture, under certain
conditions (theatrical motion pictures) or other rights (“reserved rights”) including, but
not limited to, dramatic, theatrical motion picture, publication, merchandising rights, radio
rights, live television rights, interactive rights and television sequel rights (television). Id.
at 16.A.3.a., 16.B.3.
64. Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the Transformation of
Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industry, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 663, 669 (1994). See also Robert W. Gilbert, ‘Residual Rights’ Established by
Collective Bargaining in Television and Radio, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 102
(1958): “Various talent guild agreements governing the use of recorded or filmed material
in radio and television normally permit an initial use or cycle of uses in return for basic
wages, salaries, or fees by participating talent employees, but call for additional
compensation as a condition precedent to subsequent re-use on successive broadcasts or
telecasts.”
65. Gilbert, supra note 64 at 103, adding they can vary according to “their source (i.e.,
whether paid by the original producer of the recording or film, who is the direct employer,
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Residuals are “more economically significant for most writers
66
than are separated rights.” “Almost all residuals due on made-fortheatrical motion pictures are revenue based…The writer is entitled
to a percentage of the money the project generated from uses other
than any theatrical exploitation... Residuals due for made-for67
“Over
television projects can be both fixed and revenue based.”
time, residuals became an established feature of the industry and are
68
perennially important in collective negotiations.” For example, the
principal issue leading to the 2007-2008 writers strike was the
69
question of residuals for new media.
c.

Summary

In summary, the default system works as follows:
United States

Author

Exclusive
copyright for the
audiovisual work
Contract-based
right to use and
rights to
remuneration
covered by
collective
agreements

Owner
The producer

The producer
(works made for hire)

The physical person
who authored the
work
(based on screen
credits, under
certain conditions)
(not a copyright)

or by a subsequent purchaser or user who stands in his place) or the time of payment (i.e.,
whether paid in advance, shortly after the talent employee actually performs his services,
or at a later date, following the specified re-broadcasts or re-uses).” There exist similar
mechanisms for screen actors and directors. Id. at 107-109.
66. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50 at 262-63.
67. WGA,
Residuals
Survival
Guide,
10,
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/residuals/residualssurvival05.pdf (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012).
68. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50, at 262-63.
69. On the 2007-2008 WGA strike, see Carole E. Handler, James D. Nguyen &
Marina Depietri, The WGA Strike : Picketing for a Bigger Piece of the New Media Pie, 25
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2 (2008); Bernadette A. Safrath, How Improvements in Technology
have Affected the Entertainment Industry: Writers and Actors Fight for Compensation, 26
TOURO L. REV. 115 (2011).
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C. A (Really Brief) Conclusion to the Introduction

The American producer of an audiovisual work benefits, in the
United States, from the work made for hire doctrine. This doctrine
automatically transfers initial authorship and ownership from writers
and other creative individuals to producers. By contrast, France only
grants producers a presumption of transfer. In accordance with
article 14 bis of the Berne Convention, this mechanism transfers
ownership of certain rights to the producer, even though the creative
individuals are deemed the initial authors.
The Berne Convention, which treats foreign authors as national
authors, also adds that where audiovisual works are concerned, the
law determining authorship and ownership is the law of the country
where protection is claimed. Thus, we concluded that an American
producer claiming protection in France would not be able to use the
work made for hire doctrine in that country. Since there is no such
mechanism in French law, the producer would only benefit from a
presumption of transfer of ownership for certain rights.
However, the wording of the presumption of transfer is very
specific and does not cover all exploitation rights. Furthermore, some
of the rights related to audiovisual works aim specifically at creative
individuals, thereby excluding producers. These rights tend to be
managed through blanket licensing and mandatory collective
management.
Finally, we examined the labor environment in the motion picture
industry to uncover a contractual system of quasi-copyright
management through guilds. The guilds use a sophisticated system of
authorship attribution by screen credits to redistribute compensation
collectively negotiated for each re-use of audiovisual works.

II. Anatomy of the Foreign Levies Problem: When
Workarounds Collide
The French private copying system we discussed earlier is one
example among many others of a national copyright law granting
rights to the creator and excluding the producer.
Due to
discrepancies in copyright laws around the world, it is not uncommon
for non-American copyright collectives to collect copyright levies on
behalf of American creators.
According to article 5 of the Berne Convention on national
treatment, foreign owners of rights and national authors are treated
in the same way. “This principle is upheld by collective management
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organizations which, under reciprocal representation agreements,
administer foreign repertoires on their national territory, exchange
70
information, and pay royalties to foreign owners of rights.”
Usually, copyright collectives deal with foreign levies through
reciprocal bilateral agreements: each society represents the others on
its own territory, thus offering a blanket license for an international
repertoire within a single national territory. In the meantime, the
other sister-societies license the same repertoire on behalf of the
others in their respective territories.
For example, music
performance rights are managed in the United States by ASCAP and
BMI and in France by SACEM. SACEM will collect levies for
American right-holders in France, ASCAP and BMI will collect levies
for French right-holders in the United States. Then, the societies will
transfer royalties from one country to the other through a
71
compensation mechanism.
Unfortunately, such a system cannot function for motion pictures,
as there is no American copyright collective dealing with audiovisual
works. Therefore, non-American copyright collectives started to
collect and pile up levies for the creators of audiovisual works without
being able to transfer the levies to an American counterpart.
A. The Foreign Levies Agreement

It appears that, soon after the United States entered the Berne
Convention, American film and TV producers claimed authors’
foreign levies. The guilds challenged the studios’ claim, “arguing that
writers and directors were “authors” under foreign law and thus
72
entitled to the authors’ share of the foreign levies.” The rest is
explained by journalist Dennis McDougall:
Guild vice president Carl Gottlieb, in a posting to a popular
WGA members’ blog called Writer Action, says the foreignlevies diversion scheme was originally hatched in 1990 by two
studio lawyers and then–WGA executive director Brian
Walton. According to Gottlieb — and later confirmed by

70. Collective Management of Copyright and Related Right, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about_collective_mngt.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
71. Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 17-22
(Geneva: WIPO, 2002).
72. WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, Foreign Levies Program: Program History,
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4264 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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WGA general counsel Tony Segall — attorney Jay Roth (who
later became DGA executive director and was paid over $1
million last year) and MCA/Universal general counsel Robert
Hadl (now on annual WGA retainer at $150,000, plus $300 an
hour and expenses) came to Walton with a proposition: If they
could persuade foreign collecting societies to turn over their
revenue to the WGA, this promising new income stream for
writers could be shared with the guilds and studios, including
Hadl’s. The alternative to the deal was to leave the money
offshore while fighting a protracted global legal battle with an
uncertain outcome, which included strong arguments on all
sides over which contract and national law was applicable,”
73
Gottlieb argued.
The guilds were facing two options. They could either claim the
levies by battling through a long, costly and unpredictable lawsuit
covering several foreign copyright laws, or team up with the
producers by granting them the lion’s share of the levies in exchange
for their not interfering with the collection of levies. The WGA and
74
the Directors’ Guild of America (hereafter DGA) chose the second
option and approached non-American copyright collectives,
“proposing that the guilds disburse that money on behalf of U.S.
75
Authors.” This proposition was soon accepted and both guilds
entered the so-called Foreign Levies Agreement.
1.

Origin of the Agreement

The first five-year agreement gathered the DGA and the WGA
on one side and Columbia Pictures, CPT Holdings, Metro-GoldwynMayer Pictures, MGM/United Artists Television Productions,
Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, United Artists Pictures,
Universal City Studios, Walt Disney Pictures & Television and
76
Warner Bros (hereafter the Producers) on the other side. It covered

73. Dennis McDougal, Double-Cross at the WGA : If you write for TV or film in
Hollywood, your check might never be in the mail, L.A. WEEKLY (May 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Double-Cross], http://www.laweekly.com/content/printVersion/58658/.
74. DGA, http://www.dga.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). For a history of the
creation of the DGA, see Steve Pond, Before the Guild, DGA,
http://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/1004-Winter-2010-11/Features-Before-theGuild.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
75. McDougal, Double Cross, supra note 74.
76. Foreign Levies Agreement (Jun. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
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rights from “a dozen nations.” 77 The problem is the agreement was
completely unbalanced and favored producers: “In fact, the
arithmetic wasn’t all that hard, even for a writer, to grasp. The
powerful trio divided the booty three ways: 85 percent for the studios,
78
7.5 percent for the DGA and 7.5 percent for the WGA…”
The agreement was accompanied by a set of provisions requiring
the DGA and the WGA to waive their rights to contest the amount of
their share (art. 6), and specifying that the guilds would act as
79
collecting agencies for the Producers (art. 4 and 6). It added that if a
contract between a Producer and an author was to set a different
distribution ratio for the royalties, such a contract would either be
superseded (art. 9) or result in a compensation with previously
80
collected levies (art. 7). At the same time, the Producers would
undertake not to include in their standard agreements clauses waiving
directors’ and/or writer claims to video levies and video rentals (art.
81
10).
The Foreign Levies Agreement has been renegotiated several
times in subsequent years. Its latest installment was signed in 2005,
82
gathering almost the same players. The main difference now is the
distribution key. Whereas the DGA and the WGA could only keep
15% of the Author’s share in 1990, they managed to negotiate 50% of
the video levies and video levies rentals from 2005 on, to be divided
83
between the WGA and the DGA equally.
2.

Non-Members Included

But the leonine distribution key is not the only element of
concern of this agreement.
In addition to transferring a
disproportionate amount of the royalties to the Producers, both guilds

77. Dennis McDougal, For Hollywood Writers, a Whiff of Unclaimed Foreign Gold,
THE N.Y. TIMES (September 19, 2005) [hereinafter Unclaimed Gold],
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/business/media/19guild.html?_r=0 . In 1998, most of
the sums came from Germany and France, see WGA, 1998 WGA Annual Report to
Writers,
11
(June
30,
2008)
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/Annual%20Report%2098.
pdf [hereinafter 1998 Annual Report].
78. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
79. 1990 Foreign Levies Agreement (Jun. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. With the addition of Warner Bros. Television Production.
83. 2005 Foreign Levies Agreement (Sept. 1, 2005) (one file with author). This
agreement will expire at the end of 2014.
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accepted responsibility for the levies of all American creators,
regardless of their status vis-a-vis the guilds:
Part of the “detail” that the WGA board... apparently
wanted to spare writers in 1990 was a prescient
indemnification clause, which foreign collecting societies
forced the WGA to include with each pact. The clause held
the guild liable in the event that any author due foreign levies
decided to sue one of the three entities over the deal Roth,
84
Hadl and Walton had cut.
A quick glance at the guilds jurisdiction could be useful at this
point.
Programs such as independent movies (by definition),
85
86
animation, or reality TV shows – even the very profitable adult87
entertainment film industry – are not covered by WGA or DGA
collective agreements. This, however, did not prevent the guilds from
collecting levies ultimately pertaining to non-members. In practice,
88
foreign levies were treated as residuals. Furthermore, the WGA
imposed a fee of 5% of the gross amount of residuals paid to all non89
members, and collected $863,749 in administrative fees in 2011 to
84. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
85. ANIMATION GUILD, http://animationguild.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). For a
history of the Animation Guild, see ANIMATION GUILD, Guild History,
http://animationguild.org/guild-history/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
86. Daniel J. Blau, The WGA already lost Round 1: A survivor of a little-noticed 2006
guild strike has seen this script before, L.A. TIMES (November 20, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/20/news/OE-BLAU20; Dave McNary, WGA gives up
on nonscripted effort: Guild won’t move forward in reality rumble, VARIETY (October 23,
2007), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117974582?refCatId=10.
87. On the lack of collective agreements in the adult entertainment industry, see
Holly J. Wilmet, Naked Feminism: The Unionization of the Adult Entertainment Industry,
7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 466 (1998): “Not only are adult entertainers
appropriate for union organization, but they want to be organized. Nevertheless,
organized labor has all but turned its back to the exotic dancers and pornographic movie
actors seeking assistance in securing minimum wages, benefits and job security.” It is
worth mentioning that the Screen Actors Guild, which does not include performers in
adult movies, concluded an agreement similar to the Foreign Levies Agreement covering
performers’ neighbouring rights. The Screen Actors Guild was sued by actor Ken Osmond
and proceeded to settle in 2011, just as the WGA and the DGA did.
48 (2005),
88. Residuals Survivor Guide, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA,
http://www.wga.org/subpage_writersresources.aspx?id=133.
89. Id. at 52: “The Guild administers the residuals provisions of the MBA not only on
behalf of its members, but also for the benefit of non-members and the beneficiaries of deceased
writers. The Guild’s enforcement efforts are multi-faceted and include processing of residuals
checks, pursuing claims for unpaid residuals, processing documentation necessary for
beneficiaries to receive the residual payments, monitoring the status of probate matters, and, in
some cases, acting as the beneficiary representative by receiving the residuals and issuing checks
to multiple beneficiaries.”
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offset the expenses of negotiating and administering the foreign levies
90
program.
Levies were distributed to some of the non members at least from
91
2005 on. In 2007, the WGA was holding $20.6 million in trust,
92
pending identification of the writers. To get a better sense of the
extent of the services rendered to non members, a quick search of the
DGA website is helpful. Apparently, the DGA is unable to locate
people like 1999 Academy Award winner Roberto Benigni (Life is
93
Beautiful). A visit to the WGA website also revealed that they were
unable to locate 2010 Palme d’Or Nominee Jacques Audiard (A
94
Prophet).
3.

On the Guilds’ Decision Process

The last but not least troubling element is that the Guilds‘
members were kept completely out of the negotiation of the Foreign
Levies Agreement. Once again, in the words of Dennis McDougal:
According to Gottlieb and Segall, Walton informed the WGA
board what he had done — but there was never a board vote
on the matter. Nor were the pacts that the WGA negotiated
with each foreign collecting society and the Hollywood studios
90. Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 11 (2011),
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4877. The WGA collected $977,390 in 2010, see
Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 11 (2010),
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4651, $539,934 in 2009, see Annual Financial
Report,
WRITERS
GUILD
OF
AMERICA,
WEST,
INC.,
11
(2009),
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/annreport09.pdf, and $950,624 in
2008, see Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 12 (2008),
http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=3716.
91. 2006 WGA Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., (June
10, 2006), http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=2394: “For a second year, we
distributed almost $8 million in foreign levies to our member writers (East and West), heirs and
beneficiaries of deceased members, and non-member writers of animation and nonfiction.
Undeliverable funds reached $7.2 million by the end of the fiscal year. This money is in two main
categories—residuals and clip payments due to writers who cannot be located; and foreign levies
monies held for more than seven years.” The 1998 annual report mentions that foreign levies
were distributed before 1998, without precising whether non-members were included in the
distribution. see 1998 WGA Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST,
INC., 11 (1998), http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=336, supra note 77.
92. 2007 WGAW Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 20
(2007), http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/marketplace07.pdf.
93. Foreign Levies / Non-Member Directors, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA,
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies/NonMemberDirectors.aspx (last visited May 2012).
94. Foreign Levies Program, Search by Writers Name, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA,
WEST, https://my.wgaw.org/flslookup/SearchbyName.aspx (last visited May 2012).
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ever submitted to guild members. Further, no one among the
WGA hierarchy explained to member writers — or
95
nonmembers — what they had done.
It appears that most guilds’ members were unaware of the
existence of the foreign levies. Here, the guilds seem to have failed in
their duty to keep their members informed. Considering that
residuals are a significant source of income for guild members, it is
astonishing they failed to consult their members on such an important
issue. All the more, they lacked legitimacy to deal with nonmembers’ royalties—we will come back to this point later in this
article.
B. The Class-Action Suits

Predictably, the situation turned sour after several years. As the
foreign levies were closely intertwined with the complex residuals
system, it is not surprising that the first people to notice there was a
problem were non-guild members. In contrast to guild members, who
could receive residual checks including foreign levies, non-guild
members were not receiving any compensations from abroad. Upon
learning that he was owed royalties by the WGA, non-WGA member
William Richert “filed suit against the guild in Superior Court in Los
Angeles, seeking class-action status and contending, among other
things, that the union had fraudulently collected and kept money
96
intended for others.” His example was soon followed by non-DGA
member William Webb, who sued the DGA.
1.

The WGA and DGA Class-Actions

When the guilds asked for both cases to be transferred to a
97
federal court, they were treated jointly. Interestingly, Richert and
Webb did not claim that the WGA and the DGA had failed their
obligation to redistribute levies collected through the Foreign Levies
Agreement. They instead argued that the Guilds had no right to
98
collect the levies in the first place.

95. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
96. McDougal, Unclaimed Gold, supra note 77.
97. Webb v. Dirs. Guild of Am.,Inc., No. CV05-08257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96633,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007).
98. Id. at *18, *21-22.
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On the contrary, the WGA and the DGA relied on the labor
99
dimension of the dispute. The WGA and DGA argued that the
plaintiff’s right to compensation was created by the Foreign Levies
100
Agreement and not by foreign copyright laws. In their view, the
Foreign Levies Agreement is a collective contract triggering the
101
application of labor law rules and the jurisdiction of Federal courts.
But the judge considered that “…the existence, nature, and scope of
the right asserted by plaintiffs is independent of the Foreign Levy
102
Agreement.” The court then noted that “state law claims are not
preempted if they are based on rights that exist independent of a
103
labor contract,” to conclude that the California court maintained
jurisdiction over the matter.
Then, the Court proceeded to determine whether the Foreign
Levies Agreement restricted in any ways the plaintiff’s rights and
noted that “[b]y providing that the Guilds would receive less than 100
percent of the author’s share, the Agreement clearly limited plaintiffs’
104
right to receive their full share of the foreign levies.” The court
therefore concluded that the Agreement contained “clear and
105
unmistakable language circumscribing plaintiffs’ rights.” The case
106
was therefore remanded to the Los Angeles Superior Court.
2.

The Settlements

Upon the granting of the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case,
the DGA and William Webb decided to negotiate a settlement and
filed a motion for approval, which was granted on September 10,
107
The final settlement class only encompasses non-DGA
2008.
108
directors. The DGA undertook to conduct an annual review of its
109
foreign levies program from 2006 on, under certain conditions. The
guild also undertook to publish a notice of class-action settlement

99. Id. at *10-11.
100. Id. at *20.
101. Id. at *10-11.
102. Id. at *23.
103. Id. at *23.
104. Id. at *30.
105. Id. at *30.
106. Id. at *53.
107. Order and J. Granting Joint Appl. Final Approval Class Action Settlement at 1
Webb v. Dirs. Guild of Am., Inc., No. BC35262, (2006).
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 1.
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through its website and several publications. 110 The DGA was
allowed to charge a maximum fee of ten percent to be collected on
interests generated by the sums owed to non-members, and
111
supplementary fees if necessary. In addition to this fee, the DGA
112
was able to retain the interests generated by the sums in custody. If
the DGA’s efforts proved to be unsuccessful, funds for non-members
that could not be distributed within two years would be transferred to
113
a charity, the Motion Picture & Television fund.
Soon afterwards, the WGA and William Richert negotiated a
settlement and filed a motion for approval, which was granted on
114
June 2, 2010. The settlement class encompasses all writers, WGA
and non-WGA members alike, whose works earned funds paid to the
115
WGA by foreign collection societies. The WGA agreed to have its
Foreign Levies Program audited from its inception and evaluated
116
The guild also undertook to publish a
each year from now on.
notice of class-action settlement through its website and several
117
publications. It was able to continue to administrate foreign levies
and allowed to charge a maximum fee of ten percent, to be collected
118
on interests generated by the sums and administrative fees.
However, the reasonableness of the amount of the fee will be
assessed in comparison with similar organizations, including the
119
Canadian Screenwriters Collection Society, ASCAP, and BMI.

III. Accountability for Intermediaries in Collective Copyright
Issues
Both settlements are the result of a collision. They are the
judicial by-products of a clash between an industry-negotiated
copyright workaround and a legislative tweak to an otherwise

110. Id. at 8. See also Foreign Levies, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA,
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies.aspx, (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
111. Order and J. Granting Joint Appl., supra note 107, at 4-5.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 8.
114. J. and Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 1, Richert v.
Writers Guild of Am. West, No. BC339972 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2010).
115. Id. at Exhibit A at 2.
116. Id. at Exhibit A at 2-4.
117. Notice of Final Settlement, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST,
http://www.wga.org/uploadedfiles/foreign_levies/WGAForeignLevies.pdf.
118. WGA Settlement Approval, supra note 114 at Exhibit A at 6.
119. Id.
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unworkable droit d’auteur system. They express a desperate need for
a more practical approach to copyright.
As an answer, Cohen, who developed a research agenda on
120
copyright as post-industrial property, calls for a change in the most
current theoretical assumptions of copyright’s purpose.
To
121
counteract what she calls the “incentives-for-authors rationale,” she
122
More
proposes to compare copyright with corporate property.
precisely, she suggests to quit the property-based approach of solving
problems through entitlement limitations and to consider copyright in
123
more “explicitly regulatory and relational” ways.
She is of the opinion that we should treat “copyright as a distinct,
124
post-industrial modality of property governance.” In other words,
considering copyright’s relational aspects could help us overcome
both the “copyright as property” rhetoric and debate. From there, we
could focus on the stake-holders’ relationships in copyright-based
industries.
More specifically, we could take copyright as a
governance framework enabling interactions among different sets of
stake-holders—authors, producers and collective intermediaries. The
remainder of this paper will use her theoretical work as a framework
for a reflection on collective intermediaries’ place in the
cinematographic industry.
A. Compensation Systems: Workarounds and Copyright Governance
1.

Residuals and Private Copying as Rewards for Creative Capital

Let’s go back to the Foreign Levies Agreement for a moment.
This agreement is a bridge between two systems that undermine the
fundamentals of copyright law. On the one side, the French system
breaks down copyright’s exclusive nature to compensate authors.
Practically, the private copying mechanism turns copyright into
something that looks closely like a quasi-neighboring right for
authors. On the other side of the Atlantic, industry-wide collective
agreements construct a contractual right to compensation for

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Cohen, supra note 2, at 149.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 156.
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copyright reuse. Here again, the right granted to guilds’ members
125
looks closely like performers’ neighboring rights.
As noticed by Cohen, “[n]eighboring rights laws respond to the
reality of capital-intensive creative industries by enabling those
industries to acquire the rights they need to plan and sustain their
126
127
operations.” The French private copying compensation and the
American residuals system are an answer to the needs of the
cinematographic industry. But they have one more purpose: both
article L. 311-1 C.P.I. on private copying and the WGA’s MBA
specifically encompass physical persons. Both insist on rewarding
human and creative resources.
As such, they are an important part of a copyright governance
system that considers creative capital owners as important stakeholders. In fact, both private copying and residuals are a way to
separate right to compensation from control, along lines similar to
those separating corporate ownership from corporate control. As
Cohen puts it: “[T]he existence of complex regimes of neighboring
rights in authors’ rights regimes reinforces the notion that a regime of
copyright/authors’ rights does not concern solely the rights of authors
or of intermediaries, but rather the nature of the relationship between
128
authors and intermediaries.”
Copyright as a governance system highlights the nature of the
relationship between financial capital and creative capital. Instead of
insisting on the nature and scope of authors’ rights, copyright and
workaround mechanisms ensure an adequate compensation for the
creation of immaterial property.
By stepping in, copyright
intermediaries level the playing field and enable a negotiation at
arm’s length between two categories of stake-holders: authors and
producers.
2.

Copyright Intermediaries as Stake-Holders

But authors as stake-holders have a somewhat hybrid status.
Their individual relationships within cultural industries often present

125. Craig Mazin, Residual rumble: We’re standing up for all rank-and-file, L.A.
TIMES,
December
12,
2007,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-opdustup12dec12,0,5202647.story, speaking of the residuals: “They are our version of
royalties, and they are an integral byproduct of our authorship.”
126. Cohen, supra note 2, at 155.
127. It may be useful to remember here that the French private copying system,
namely article L 311-7 C.P.I. also grants producers one third of all private copying levies.
128. Cohen, supra note 2, at 156.
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many of the characteristics of a labor relationship. Such a situation
supports American artists’ choice to unionize and French authors’
decision to create copyright collectives. But their collective action
presents a very different aspect. Both the SACD and the WGA
negotiate large scale deals granting access to a pool of creative
resources. SACD does so directly by granting repertoire licenses on
creative content. The WGA does so by framing producers’ access to
creators. In that respect, unions and copyright collectives act as
capital owners, trying to get the best out of their assets. In this
context, authors consequently “perform a role analogous to the
129
shareholders’ role.”
The Foreign Levies Agreement illustrates the shortcomings of
this situation. When negotiating with the producers, the guilds
privileged their functions as capital managers. The same can be said
of the foreign copyright collectives who ditched foreign right-holders’
levies to the guilds without much concern about their ability or
willingness to fulfill the task. The interest of the structures took over
their members’ interest.
Thomas Paris considers that collective management of copyright
130
revolves around three different logics and his findings can be
extended to the American artists unions. His belief is that there are
three groups of interest at play within collective copyright
intermediaries: an administrative structure, an institutional structure,
131
and a right-holders’ structure.
The administrative structure will act to maintain its own existence,
by increasing the number of employees, the volume of activities, and
132
the amount of the fees. The institutional structure will make of the
collective an inescapable intermediary, for example by extending the
collective’s jurisdiction, lobbying around, and starting costly

129. Id. at 160.
130. Thomas Paris, L’organisation de la gestion collective des droits d’auteur : entre
rationalisation et logique d’institution [The Organization of Collective Management of
Copyright: From Rationalization and Logic Institution] 16:88 RÉSEAUX 123, 132 (1998).
131. Id. at 132. See also Fabrice Rochelandet, Are Copyright Collecting Societies
Efficient Organisations? An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in
Europe, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS, 178-181 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt, eds. 2003).
132. For example, the WGA created a 5% management fee on residuals to nonmembers in 2006, while maintaining a 1.5% fee for members, see Writers Guild of
America, Residuals Guide, supra note 88, at 52.
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lawsuits. 133 Finally, the right-holders’ structure will try to maximize
their profits by closely monitoring the amount of the fees, negotiating
more leeway for contracting out of the system, and discussing the
134
scope of social programs.
The Foreign Levies Agreement can be understood as a meeting of
both administrative and institutional structures, to the detriment of
the right-holders’ structure. The WGA’s administrative structure of
the time decided not to jeopardize its current position by entering
long-term, costly, highly risky litigation, which would not bear fruit
during its mandate. The SACD’s institutional structure thought it
best to forge a new bilateral agreement to channel out foreign levies.
That way, it could boast about its efficiency while strengthening its
position as an essential intermediary.
B. Settlements Blurring the Accountability Line

Thus, collective copyright intermediaries are prone to favor their
own interests over those of authors and “this tendency requires
135
appropriate structural correction.”
But such structural remedies
cannot be found in copyright law. Instead, in this case, the parties
spontaneously solved their dispute outside court.
This is yet another instance of the seemingly increasing use of
136
class-action settlements to deal with thorny copyright issues. Where
laws have a chilling effect, parties seek an escape through litigation.
One can wonder to which extent the solution is worse than the
problem. Class-actions typically generate coordination issues among
the class-members, and in the case of the Guilds, leave very little
wiggle room for uninformed non-guild members. They are, at best, a
137
In fact, the use of settlement as a
“better than none” solution.
regulation tool is problematic on several levels.

133. WGA’s attempt to unionize reality TV writers in order to enhance the effects of
its 2007 strike is a good example of that logic, see Blau, supra note 86 and McNary, supra
note 86. Had the guild been successful, the producers would have run short of any fresh
content in a very short while after the beginning of the strike. See also The show will
resume : Striking writers go back to their desks, THE ECONOMIST, 12 February 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/10677757 precising: “[t]hey also gave up trying to get reality
television and animation covered by union terms. That is important: being able to fill
holes with reality shows protected the media companies financially during the strike.”
134. Paris, supra note 130, at 132.
135. Id. at 161.
136. C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property
Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 685, 688 (2010).
137. Id. at 695.
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Settlement v. Escheat

A closer look at the DGA settlement tells us that the DGA will
keep undeliverable money for two years only, keep the interest
generated by the funds in custody, charge a management fee in
addition to keeping the interests, and transfer undeliverable funds to
a charity after two years. The WGA settlement provides that the
guild will keep the money until declared undeliverable, discuss in
good faith the definition and fate of undeliverable funds, transfer
levies whose owner cannot be located to the State of California, and
138
transfer levies whose owner cannot be identified to a charity.
But an examination of California’s Unclaimed Property Law139
140
tells us that the guilds are business associations who hold residuals
141
in a fiduciary capacity, consequently falling under its scope. This
act provides that any property held by a third-party for more than
seven years should revert to the State, to be kept until its rightful
owner claims it. The Unclaimed Property Act is a law established for
public policy reasons: the right to escheat cannot be waived by private
142
Consequently, no Screen Actors Guild by-laws can
agreement.
prevent residuals held for more than seven years to escheat to the
143
State of California, as stated by Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory.
In this decision, the court confirmed that funds retained by a guild for
more than seven years should escheat to the State of California, even
though the Screen Actors Guild by-law stated that residuals
unclaimed for at least six years would revert to the guild for the
benefit of all of its members.
Both settlements are problematic in several regards. First, the
DGA settlement stipulates that undeliverable funds will be
transferred to a charity after two years. It circumvents escheat by
incorporating provisions that would be prohibited in a guild by-law.
138. See infra, II. B. 2.
139. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §§ 1500-1599 (2012).
140. Id. §1501 (c).
141. Id. §1518 (a).
142. Cal. Civ. Code §3513 (2012): “Any one may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be
contravened by a private agreement.” Guilds’ by-laws are considered as private
agreements.
143. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory, 91 Cal. App. 3d 111, 154 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
1979). The Screen Actors Guild appealed from a declaratory judgment decreeing that
residuals held by it on behalf of its members and pursuant to a specific by-law were subject
to escheat to the State of California after seven years. The judgment under appeal was
affirmed. Id.

2012]

COPYRIGHT WORKAROUNDS IN THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY

31

Furthermore, considering that the levies have been held since the
early 1990s, two years is a very short delay for directors to track their
dues. Second, when the money escheat to the State, it remains under
144
the State Controller’s custody, who is entitled to retain the
145
146
interest, but cannot charge any fee. On the contrary, both guilds
147
Thus,
are allowed to retain a ten percent fee on foreign levies.
authors whose levies have been held for more than seven years
already are in a worse situation than if the settlements had not taken
place. Third, the State of California built an online searchable
database that allows anyone to look for unclaimed property and to
determine the exact amount held in custody and the origin of the
148
amount. On the contrary, both DGA and WGA websites do not
provide the amounts held in custody.
Currently, the DGA
distinguishes between people owed $25 to $49.99 and people owed
149
The WGA does not provide any information
more than $50.
150
The settlements actually make it more
regarding the amounts.
difficult for authors to know the exact amounts they are entitled to
receive.
151
In Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory, the court made two
interesting comments:
In this respect [the Screen Actors Guild] may do a
better job than the state because its search for such
persons is more industry-oriented and more prolonged.
It also appears that plaintiff provides a better interest
152
return on these residuals than the state does.

144. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1560(a).
145. Id. §1562. The interest is transferred to the State’s General Fund.
146. Id. §1522: “No service, handling, maintenance or other charge or fee of any kind
which is imposed because of the inactive or unclaimed status contemplated by this chapter,
may be deducted or withheld from any property subject to escheat under this chapter,
unless specifically permitted by this chapter.”
147. For the DGA fee collected in addition to interests, see infra note 149. For the
WGA fee, see infra note 150.
148. Unclaimed Property Search, CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Sept.
24, 2012), http://scoweb.sco.ca.gov/UCP/Default.aspx.
GUILD
OF
AMERICA,
149. Non
Members
Directors,
DIRECTORS
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies/NonMemberDirectors.aspx (last visited on Oct. 5,
2012).
150. WGAW
Foreign
Levies
Program,
WGA,
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4262 (last visited on Oct. 5, 2012).
151. Cory, supra note 143, at 113.
152. Id. at 116 n.5.
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[The Screen Actors Guild] undoubtedly does occupy
a different relationship to its members and they to each
other than ordinarily obtains between and among
holders and owners of unclaimed property.
The
Legislature may wish to make this circumstance the
basis for a special exemption of the unclaimed residuals
at issue, but in our view it has not accomplished this
153
exemption in the present wording of the statute.
In sum, neither the guild’s by-laws, nor their supposed efficiency
should prevent the money held in custody to escheat, as long as guilds
154
fall under the scope of the Unclaimed Property Law. By granting
the settlements, the Los Angeles’ courts have achieved a “quasilegislative” outcome regarding unclaimed levies.
2.

A Quasi-Legislative Outcome

Pamela Samuelson recently used the expression “quasi155
legislative” to qualify a copyright settlement which, “if approved,
would have accomplished changes that would be tantamount to
156
Such settlements address problems that
legislative reform.”
theoretically should not be solved by courts: “[w]hile a legislative
solution to some of these problems might be possible…it may be
unlikely to occur for various reasons, including because rights
157
allocations are generally matters of contract interpretation.”
At last, even though the class obtained compensation for the
levies that were unduly collected by the guilds, both settlements
created a de facto mandatory system of collective management for
audiovisual works. Non-members are now stuck in a system of
collection over which they have no control. They have no way to
participate in the guilds’ decision process and the external control is
left in the hands of accounting firms in charge of the yearly audits.
In fact, by creating a mutual collection scheme, the WGA-DGA
settlements “change some substantive default rules of copyright law
and [have] substantial spillover effects for third parties not
158
represented in the settlement negotiations.” This outcome is similar
153. Id. at 116 n.6.
154. Civ. Proc. §§1500-1599.
155. Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS.
L. REV. 479, 479 (2011).
156. Id. at 515.
157. Id. at 501.
158. Id. at 515.
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the tentative Google Book Settlement in many regards. In both
cases, the litigation and settlement project were prompted by unclear
159
ownership on certain rights and a guild more inclined to settle than
160
to continue a “full-dress” suit, and both are akin to copyright
reform.
Worse, the WGA-DGA settlements do not even address the
question of ownership of the foreign levies which brought up the
class-actions in the first place. The rights will remain unclear.
Furthermore, the settlements ensure the continued existence of a
distribution key for foreign levies that no one is even sure is right. If
they bring predictability, it is at the cost of fairness.
Finally, the settlements are no answer to the larger problem of the
accountability of copyright intermediaries. They impact the nature
and management of copyright, but they do not question the
behaviour or internal governance mechanisms for guilds and
copyright collectives. The only concession made to transparency is
the annual intervention of exterior accounting firms, which may, or
may not, enable members and non-members to challenge the
practices of guilds and copyright collectives. That way, settlements
cannot be considered as a relevant tool for copyright governance.

IV. Conclusion
Whether of contractual or legislative origin, copyright
workarounds aim at ensuring direct compensation for creative
people. They specifically target physical persons, by granting them a
fair share of profits. They reward creative input, sometimes outside
of the copyright field. Unfortunately, copyright workarounds are
devised at the national level. Accordingly, they are submitted to the
interference of international copyright conventions. Thus, when
workarounds based on drastically different national laws collide,
turmoil in international exploitation is inevitable. Agreements such
as the Foreign Levies Agreement embody the Berne Convention’s
systemic failure to harmonize the protection regimens for audiovisual
works. They are proof that one workaround system can be the
demise of another.
They illustrate the limits of copyright
intermediation in capital intensive domains such as the
cinematographic industry.

159. Id. at 498-502.
160. Id. at 512-14, specifically at 513.

34

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

Developed in the absence of other structural remedies, national
settlements are a less than ideal tool to solve the problem. The
situation now calls for an inquiry into potential sources of
accountability for copyright intermediaries.

